討論個有趣的話題：你有錢會如何生活？

zerowing · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 00:10:55

本帖最后由 zerowing 于 2016-6-30 00:15 編輯

先分享一個TED的關(guān)于社會分化的演講。
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如果無法播放，請點擊此處在新窗口打開

大家參與的時候可以講講如果你擁有一個穩(wěn)定的足夠多的資金來源，你將如何生活？或者說，你的生活是怎么個樣子，你的理想又是什么樣子。
或者，你也可以就這個視頻發(fā)表你的感想。

歡迎參與。

georgemcu · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 00:16:50

有錢了繼續(xù)看書，然后設(shè)計并自己加工零件，組裝，享受快樂。有錢了也不能閑著，要么腦子壞掉或身體健康也會壞掉。

georgemcu · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 00:18:16

精神與身體保持一定的張力

georgemcu · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 00:21:19

一直在看你的帖子才看到總回復(fù)的42頁，發(fā)現(xiàn)有個消息提醒，哈哈。應(yīng)該是在社區(qū)里第一次坐到沙發(fā)，開心。零俠還在國外正好是白天吧，我們國內(nèi)可是夜里咯

迷茫的維修 · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 03:35:43

以前不敢喝的紅酒，現(xiàn)在敢喝了，以前不敢吃的牛排，現(xiàn)在買他一冰箱，自己喜愛的衣服鞋子可以多買幾雙了，菜和肉一定要吃最天然的，
尼瑪，該怎么過，還怎么過唄，
可能會考慮出國定居

宇宙立方 · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 06:32:51

以前8爺說，假如有3億，你會干什么。
那個外地上市私企收購這家電子廠，花了6億，80%股份。前老板還占20%。

吳恩0 · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 07:08:26

我發(fā)現(xiàn)。隨著收入的增加。我的消費反而減少。
除了吃。舍得之外。其他所有支出都減少。

如果天上掉下一堆錢。我想建一籃球場。
如果我賺了一堆錢。我想買一二手跑車。然后去把妹。哈哈。

劉嵩 · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 07:58:48

本帖最后由劉嵩于 2016-6-30 08:02 編輯

ZT你的祖先，你的命運

Inequality of income and wealth has risen in America since the 1970s, yet a large-scale research study recently found that social mobility hadn’t changed much during that time. How can that be?

美國社會的收入和財富不平等自1970年代就一直在攀升，然而近期一項大規(guī)模調(diào)查研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，社會的流動性在這段時間內(nèi)并沒有發(fā)生大的變化。怎么回事呢？

The study, by researchers at Harvard and Berkeley, tells only part of the story. It may be true that mobility hasn’t slowed — but, more to the point, mobility has always been slow.

這項由哈佛和伯克利大學(xué)進行的研究其實只講述了整個故事的一個方面。是的，流動性也許并沒有變得更低，但更關(guān)鍵的是，流動性一直就很低。

When you look across centuries, and at social status broadly measured — not just income and wealth, but also occupation, education and longevity — social mobility is much slower than many of us believe, or want to believe. This is true in Sweden, a social welfare state; England, where industrial capitalism was born; the United States, one of the most heterogeneous societies in history; and India, a fairly new democracy hobbled by the legacy of caste.

當你的目光掃過幾個世紀，從更廣義的度量標準審視社會地位這個概念——不僅僅是收入和財富，還包括職業(yè)、教育水平和壽命——你會發(fā)現(xiàn)社會流動性比我們許多人相信的，或希望的要低得多。在許多國家，比如瑞典（一個社會福利國家）、英國（工業(yè)資本主義誕生之地）、美國（歷史上多樣性最豐富的社會之一）、印度（一個受種姓制度拖累的年輕的民主國家），情況皆是如此。

Capitalism has not led to pervasive, rapid mobility. Nor have democratization, mass public education, the decline of nepotism, redistributive taxation, the emancipation of women, or even, as in China, socialist revolution.

資本主義并沒有導(dǎo)致廣泛的、快速的社會流動。民主化同樣沒有，大眾教育、裙帶主義的衰退、以重新分配財富為目的的稅收、婦女解放、甚至社會主義改革（比如中國），這些全都沒有導(dǎo)致廣泛的、快速的社會流動。

To a striking extent, your overall life chances can be predicted not just from your parents’ status but also from your great-great-great-grandparents’. The recent study suggests that 10 percent of variation in income can be predicted based on your parents’ earnings. In contrast, my colleagues and I estimate that 50 to 60 percent of variation in overall status is determined by your lineage.

你整體的人生際遇不僅僅能從你父母的社會地位，也能從你的曾-曾-曾祖父母的社會地位預(yù)測出來，準確程度足以令人吃驚。最新的研究表明，收入差異【編注：即偏離基準值的幅度】中，10%可以從你父母的收入得到預(yù)測。而我的同事和我估計，就廣義的社會地位來講，其差異幅度的50-60%都由你的血統(tǒng)決定了。

The fortunes of high-status families inexorably fall, and those of low-status families rise, toward the average — what social scientists call “regression to the mean” — but the process can take 10 to 15 generations (300 to 450 years), much longer than most social scientists have estimated in the past.

高門注定跌落，而寒門勢必崛起，兩者向均值趨同——即社會學(xué)家所謂的“均值回歸”——這個過程會發(fā)生，但需要10至15代人的時間（300至450年），比過去大多數(shù)社會學(xué)家估計的都要長得多。

We came to these conclusions after examining reams of data on surnames, a surprisingly strong indicator of social status, in eight countries — Chile, China, England, India, Japan, South Korea, Sweden and the United States — going back centuries. Across all of them, rare or distinctive surnames associated with elite families many generations ago are still disproportionately represented among today’s elites.

讓人始料未及的是，姓氏是社會地位的一個有力指標，我們對其相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)做了海量的分析，最終得到上述結(jié)論。這些數(shù)據(jù)來自八個國家：智利、中國、英國、印度、日本、韓國、瑞典和美國，并向上追溯了數(shù)個世紀。在所有國家中，來自精英家族的罕見或特別的姓氏在許多代之后在精英階層的名單中仍占有很高比例。

Does this imply that individuals have no control over their life outcomes? No. In modern meritocratic societies, success still depends on individual effort. Our findings suggest, however, that the compulsion to strive, the talent to prosper and the ability to overcome failure are strongly inherited.

這是不是意味著個人對自己的命運毫無掌控之力？不。在現(xiàn)代精英統(tǒng)治的社會里，成功依然依賴個人奮斗。我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)只是表明，出人頭地的欲望、發(fā)家致富的天賦和戰(zhàn)勝失敗的能力都有很大一部分來自遺傳。

We can’t know for certain what the mechanism of that inheritance is, though we know that genetics plays a surprisingly strong role. Alternative explanations that are in vogue — cultural traits, family economic resources, social networks — don’t hold up to scrutiny.

我們無法確切知曉這種遺傳的機制是什么，但是我們知道基因在此出人意料地扮演了一個重要角色。其他流行的解釋——文化特質(zhì)、家庭經(jīng)濟資源、人脈——則經(jīng)不起推敲。

Because our findings run against the intuition that modernity, and in particular capitalism, has eroded the impact of ancestry on a person’s life chances, I need to explain how we arrived at them.

因為我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)與這樣一種直覺相悖，那就是：現(xiàn)代化，尤其是資本主義，已經(jīng)弱化了血統(tǒng)對一個人生活際遇的影響。所以我有必要解釋下我們是怎么得到這些發(fā)現(xiàn)的。

Let’s start with Sweden, which — like Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway — is one of the world’s most equal societies in terms of income. To our surprise, we found that social mobility in Sweden today was no greater than in Britain or the United States today — or even Sweden in the 18th century.

讓我們從瑞典開始。同丹麥、芬蘭、冰島和挪威一樣，瑞典是世界上收入最平等的國家之一。讓我們吃驚的是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當今瑞典的社會流動性并不比當今英國或是美國更高，甚至也不高于18世紀的瑞典。

Sweden still has a nobility. Those nobles no longer hold de facto political power, but their family records are stored by the Riddarhuset (House of Nobility), a society created in 1626. We estimate that about 56,000 Swedes hold rare surnames associated with the three historic tiers of nobles. (Variations on the names of the unfortunate Rosencrantz and Guildenstern of “Hamlet” are on the list.)

瑞典仍然存在貴族。這些貴族不再享有實際的政治權(quán)力，但他們的家族記錄則被貴族院（Riddarhuset）——這一創(chuàng)立于1626年的機構(gòu)存檔。據(jù)我們估計，大約有56,000位瑞典人的姓氏同歷史上的三階貴族有聯(lián)系。【譯注：瑞典的貴族分為三個等級，領(lǐng)主（lord）、騎士（knight）和士紳（esquire）。】（比如《哈姆雷特》一劇中兩個不幸人物的姓氏Rosencrantz和Guildenstern就在其中。）

Another elite group are Swedes whose ancestors — a rising educated class of clerics, scholars, merchants — Latinized their surnames in the 17th and 18th centuries (like the father of the botanist Carolus Linnaeus). Adopting elite names was limited by law in Sweden in 1901, so a vast majority of people holding them are descended from prominent families.

另一個精英群體的先輩則是崛起的教士、學(xué)者或商人，他們受過教育并于17世紀到18世紀之間把自己的姓氏拉丁化，比如植物學(xué)家林奈（Carolus Linnaeus）的父親。1901年瑞典立法限制采用精英姓氏的行為，所以今天擁有這些姓氏的人大多出身于名門望族。

Given the egalitarian nature of Swedish society, one would expect that people with these elite surnames should be no better off than other Swedes. That isn’t so. In a sample of six Stockholm-area municipalities in 2008, rich and poor, we found that the average taxable income of people with noble names was 44 percent higher than that of people with the common surname Andersson. Those with Latinized names had average taxable incomes 27 percent higher than those named Andersson.

考慮到瑞典社會的平等主義性質(zhì)，可以預(yù)計擁有這些精英姓氏的人不會比其他瑞典人要混得好。事實并非如此。2008年我們所做的一項研究對斯德哥爾摩地區(qū)六個貧富不一的自治市進行了取樣，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)擁有貴族姓氏的人，其應(yīng)稅所得（taxable income）要比擁有Andersson這一普通姓氏的人高44%。那些擁有拉丁化名字的人，其平均應(yīng)稅所得要比Andersson們高27%。

Surnames of titled nobles (counts and barons) are represented in the register of the Swedish Bar Association at six times the rate they occur in the general population (three times the rate, for untitled-noble and Latinized surnames). The same goes for Swedish doctors.

有封號貴族（伯爵或男爵）的姓氏出現(xiàn)在瑞典律師協(xié)會登記名單中的比例是他們在全體國民中比例的六倍（對無封號貴族以及拉丁化姓氏，則是3倍）。在瑞典的醫(yī)生群體當中，情況也是如此。

Among those who completed master’s theses at Uppsala University from 2000 to 2012, Swedes with elite surnames were overrepresented by 60 to 80 percent compared with those with the common surname prefixes Lund- and Berg-.

2000年至2012年，在烏普薩拉大學(xué)完成碩士論文的學(xué)生中，擁有精英姓氏的瑞典學(xué)生的代表率要比有著普通姓名前綴Lund-、Berg-的學(xué)生高60%到80%。【譯注：文中多次用到“代表率”這個指標，是指被考察群體在某特征人群中的占比除以其在全國人口中的占比，若得數(shù)遠大于1，則是過度代表（overrepresented），若得數(shù)小于1，則是代表不足（underrepresented）。】

Over centuries, there is movement toward the mean, but it is slow. In three of the Royal Academies of Sweden, half of the members from 1740 to 1769 held one of the elite surnames in our sample; by 2010, only 4 percent did — but these surnames were held by just 0.7 percent of all Swedes, so they were still strongly overrepresented. In short, nearly 100 years of social democratic policies in Sweden, while creating a very egalitarian society, have failed to accelerate social mobility.

數(shù)世紀以來，均值回歸化的趨勢一直存在，但速度緩慢。在三所瑞典皇家學(xué)院，我們調(diào)查的樣本人群中有一半在1740年至1769年間擁有一個精英姓氏；到2010年，這個比例僅為4%——但是全體瑞典人中只有0.7%的人擁有這些精英姓氏，所以精英姓氏的高代表率仍顯得非常突出。簡而言之，瑞典近100年的社會民主化政策雖然創(chuàng)造了一個平等主義的社會，卻沒能加速社會流動性。

What if we go back even further in time — to medieval England?

如果我們在時間上回溯得更遠——到中世紀的英格蘭，又會怎樣呢？

We estimate that one-tenth of all surnames in contemporary England can be traced to the occupation of a medieval ancestor — names like Smith (the most common surname in the United States, England and Australia), Baker, Butler, Carter, Chamberlain, Cook, Shepherd, Stewart and Wright. Tax records suggest that most surnames became heritable by 1300.

我們估計十分之一的當今英格蘭姓氏可以同其中世紀的祖先的職業(yè)聯(lián)系起來——比如Smith（美國、英格蘭和澳大利亞最常見的姓氏）、Baker、Butler、Carter、Chamberlain、Cook、Shepherd、Stewart and Wright。【譯注：從Smith到Wright，這些姓氏分別對應(yīng)著鐵匠、烤面包師、管家、馬車司機、封建領(lǐng)主的大管家、廚師、牧羊人、事務(wù)官、修船工。】稅賦記錄顯示，大多數(shù)姓氏從1300年前后開始變成了可繼承姓氏。

We compared the frequency of these common surnames in the population as a whole against elite groups, as drawn from several sources, including membership rolls at Oxford and Cambridge, dating as far back as 1170, and probate records from 1384 onward.

我們對比了人群中這些普通姓氏和精英姓氏出現(xiàn)的頻率，數(shù)據(jù)來源有幾個，包括最早追溯至1170年的牛津與劍橋錄取名單，和1384年以來的遺囑記錄。

We found that late medieval England was no less mobile than modern England — contrary to the common assumption of a static feudal order. It took just seven generations for the successful descendants of illiterate village artisans of 1300 to be incorporated fully into the educated elite of 1500 — that is, the frequency of their names in the Oxbridge rolls reached the level around where it is today. By 1620, according to probate records, people with names like Butcher and Baker had nearly as much wealth as people with high-status surnames like Rochester and Radcliffe.

我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，中世紀晚期英格蘭的社會流動性不比現(xiàn)代英國差——這和靜止的封建秩序這一通常印象恰恰相反。公元1300年一個目不識丁的村夫的后代僅僅需要7代便可在1500年成為徹頭徹尾的受過良好教育的精英分子——也就是說，他們的姓氏出現(xiàn)在牛津劍橋錄取名單上的頻率已經(jīng)和今天差不多了。到1620年，根據(jù)遺囑記錄，有著像Butcher和Baker這樣平民姓氏的人已經(jīng)和有著諸如Rochester 和Radcliffe這種高貴姓氏的人一樣富有了。

Take Chaucer. A commoner by birth — his name probably comes from the French word for shoemaker — he became a courtier, a diplomat and a member of Parliament, and his great-great-grandson was even briefly considered heir to the throne during the reign of Richard III.

比如著名的英國詩人喬叟（Chaucer），他出生在一個平凡的家庭——他的姓氏可能來自法語，意思是鞋匠——卻成為了朝臣、外交家和國會議員。他的曾-曾孫甚至在理查三世時期被短暫地視作王位的繼承人。

Of course, mobility, in medieval times as now, worked both ways. Just as Chaucer’s progeny prospered, other previously well-off families declined. The medieval noble surname Cholmondeley was, by the 19th century, held by a good number of farm laborers.

當然，不管是在中世紀還是當代，社會流動性都是雙向的。當喬叟的后代們飛黃騰達時，其他曾經(jīng)輝煌的家族也在衰落。中世紀時的貴族姓氏Cholmondeley到了19世紀，已為許多農(nóng)民擁有。

In any generation, happy accidents (including extraordinary talent) will produce new high-status families. It is impossible to predict which particular families are likely to experience such boosts. What is predictable is what the path to elite status will look like, and the path back to the mean. Both happen at a very slow pace.

在任何時代，天上掉下的餡餅（包括超凡的天才）都可以成就新的上層家族。預(yù)測具體哪些家庭會碰上這樣的運氣是不可能的。可以預(yù)測的是通向精英階層的道路和重回平民階級的道路。兩個方向的流動都非常緩慢。

For all the creative destruction unleashed by capitalism, the industrial revolution did not accelerate mobility. Looking at 181 rare surnames held by the wealthiest 15 percent of English and Welsh people in the mid-19th century — to be clear, these were not the same elite surnames as in the medieval era — we found that people with these surnames who died between 1999 and 2012 were more than three times as wealthy as the average person.

雖然資本主義帶來了種種創(chuàng)造性破壞，但工業(yè)革命并沒有加速社會流動。舉例來說，19世紀中期英格蘭和威爾士最富有的15%的人當中，有181個貴族姓氏（當然，這些姓氏與中世紀的精英姓氏已有不同），我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在1999年到2012年間死亡的擁有這些姓氏的人士的財富是普通人的三倍還多。

If your surname is rare, and someone with that surname attended Oxford or Cambridge around 1800, your odds of being enrolled at those universities are nearly four times greater than the average person. This slowness of mobility has persisted despite a vast expansion in public financing for secondary and university education, and the adoption of much more open and meritocratic admissions at both schools.

如果你的姓氏很少見，而且擁有你的姓氏的人在1800年進入了牛津或劍橋，那么你被這兩所大學(xué)錄取的幾率就比普通人高三倍。盡管對中學(xué)和大學(xué)教育的公共開支大幅增加，而且兩所大學(xué)的錄取條件也已變得更加公開、更加以實力為考量，但社會流動緩慢狀況仍在繼續(xù)。

What about America, the self-proclaimed land of opportunity?

那么美國，這個自詡“機會的國度”，其情況又如何呢?

We selected a sampling of high- and low-status American surnames. The elite ones were held by descendants of Ivy League alumni who graduated by 1850, exceptionally wealthy people with rare surnames in 1923-24 (when public inspection of income-tax payments was legal) and Ashkenazi Jews. The low-status names were associated with black Americans whose ancestors most likely arrived as slaves, and the descendants of French colonists in North America before 1763.

我們挑選了一些代表社會上層和下層的姓氏作為樣本。上層姓氏的擁有者們一部分是1850年畢業(yè)的常青藤校友的后代，他們是絕對的富人，在1923-24年擁有少見的姓氏（那時對個人所得稅支付情況進行公開檢查仍是合法的），另一部分則是阿什肯納茲猶太人。下層姓氏的擁有者則是美國黑人和1763年前在北美的法國殖民者的后裔，前者的祖先大多以奴隸的身份來到美國。

We chose only surnames closely correlated with these subgroups — for example, Rabinowitz for American Jews, and Washington for black Americans.

我們只選擇與上述背景緊密相關(guān)的姓氏——比如，Rabinowitz代表了美國猶太人，而Washington則是典型的美國黑人。

We used two indicators of social status: the American Medical Association’s directory of physicians and registries of licensed attorneys, along with their dates of registration, in 25 states, covering 74 percent of the population.

我們采納了兩個衡量社會地位的指標：美國醫(yī)學(xué)協(xié)會的內(nèi)科醫(yī)生名錄和執(zhí)業(yè)律師注冊名單，以及注冊時間，調(diào)查覆蓋25個州，涵蓋了此類人口的74%。

In the early to mid-20th century we found the expected regression toward the mean for all of these groups, except for Jews and blacks — which reflects the reality of quotas that had barred Jews from many elite schools, and of racial segregation, which was not fully outlawed until the 1960s.

我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在20世紀初期至中葉，所有這些群體都如預(yù)想那樣出現(xiàn)了均值回歸的情形，只有猶太人和黑人除外——這反應(yīng)了當時的現(xiàn)實狀況：一是配額制限制了猶太人進入許多精英學(xué)校的機會，二是種族隔離，直到1960年代種族隔離才被全面視作非法。

Starting in the 1970s, Jews began, over all, a decline in social status, while blacks began a corresponding rise, at least as measured by the doctors’ directory. But both trends are very slow. At the current rate, for example, it will be 300 years before Ashkenazi Jews cease to be overrepresented among American doctors, and even 200 years from now the descendants of enslaved African-Americans will still be underrepresented.

從1970年代起，整體而言猶太人的社會地位開始下降，而黑人的社會地位則相應(yīng)地開始上升，至少醫(yī)生名錄反映出的狀況如此。但這兩種趨勢都十分緩慢。比方說，按現(xiàn)在的速度，得過300年后，阿什肯納茲猶太人在美國醫(yī)生群體中的過度代表情形才會消失，甚至200年后，曾為奴隸的非洲裔美國人的后代在醫(yī)生群體中仍將存在代表不足的情形。

Family names tell you, for better or worse, a lot: The average life span of an American with the typically Jewish surname Katz is 80.2 years, compared with 64.6 years for those with the surname Begay (or Begaye), which is strongly associated with Native Americans. Heberts, whites of New France descent, live on average three years less than Dohertys, whites of Irish descent.

不管是好是壞，姓氏總是包含有大量信息：擁有典型的猶太姓氏Katz的美國人，其平均壽命是80.2歲，與此相對的則是擁有Begay（或是Begaye）這一與美洲土著緊密相關(guān)的姓氏的人，他們平均壽命只有64.6歲。新法蘭西殖民地的白人后代比愛爾蘭白人后代平均少活3年，前者的典型姓名是Hebert，而后者往往姓Doherty。

But to be clear, we found no evidence that certain racial groups innately did better than others. Very high-status groups in America include Ashkenazi Jews, Egyptian Copts, Iranian Muslims, Indian Hindus and Christians, and West Africans. The descendants of French Canadian settlers don’t suffer racial discrimination, but their upward mobility, like that of blacks, has been slow.

不過要澄清的是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)并沒有證據(jù)顯示某些種族天生就比其他種族過得好。在美國擁有非常高社會地位的族群包括阿什肯納茲猶太人、埃及科普特人、伊朗穆斯林、來自印度的印度教徒和基督徒，以及西非移民。法裔加拿大移民的后裔并沒有種族歧視的煩惱，但同黑人一樣，他們向社會上層的流動一直很緩慢。

Chen (a common Chinese surname) is of higher status than Churchill. Appiah (a Ghanaian surname) is higher than Olson (or Olsen), a common white surname of average status. Very little information about status can be surmised by the most common American surnames — the top five are Smith, Johnson, Williams, Brown and Jones, which all originated in England — because they are held by a mix of whites and blacks.

姓Chen（常見的華裔姓氏）的比姓Churchill的社會地位高。姓Appiah（常見加納姓氏）的比姓Olson（或Olsen）的社會地位高，后者是常見的普通白人的姓氏。從美國最常見的姓氏中很難得出關(guān)于社會地位的信息（前五位的姓氏是Smith、Johnson、Williams、Brown和Jones，他們都源自英格蘭），因為這些人中有白人也有黑人。

Our findings were replicated in Chile, India, Japan, South Korea and, surprisingly, China, which stands out as a demonstration of the resilience of status — even after a Communist revolution nearly unparalleled in its ferocity, class hatred and mass displacement.

我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)在智利、印度、日本、韓國和中國都得到了印證。在中國的驚人發(fā)現(xiàn)向我們清晰地展示了社會地位的難以撼動，即便是在一場共產(chǎn)主義革命之后（其殘暴程度、階級仇恨的強度和人口遷移規(guī)模前所未有），情形仍是如此。

Hundreds of thousands of relatively prosperous mainland Chinese fled to Taiwan with the Nationalists in the late 1940s. Under Communist agrarian reform, as much as 43 percent of all land was seized and redistributed. The Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 saw purges of scholars and other former elites and “class enemies.”

1940年代末期，數(shù)百萬大陸居民隨國民黨逃到臺灣，他們都是相對富裕的中國人。中共的土地革命奪取了43%的土地并將其重新分配。1966年至1976年的文化大革命對學(xué)者、其他前社會精英分子以及“階級敵人”進行了大清洗。

In China, there are only about 4,000 surnames; the 100 most common are held by nearly 85 percent of the population. Yet we were able to identify 13 rare surnames that were exceptionally overrepresented among successful candidates in imperial examinations in the 19th century. Remarkably, holders of these 13 surnames are disproportionately found now among professors and students at elite universities, government officials, and heads of corporate boards. Social mobility in the Communist era has accelerated, but by very little. Mao failed.

在中國，總共只有大約4,000種姓氏，其中最常見的100個占了85%的人口。不過我們?nèi)赃x出了13種罕見姓氏，擁有這些姓氏的人在19世紀的科舉考試成功者中的過度代表情形十分突出。在今天，這13個姓氏的擁有者在教授、名牌大學(xué)的學(xué)生、政府官員和公司高管中的占比也較高。在共產(chǎn)主義的時代，中國的社會流動性曾得到提升，但十分微弱。毛澤東的努力失敗了。

These findings may surprise two groups that are often politically opposed: those who believe that certain “cultures” are higher-achieving than others and those who attribute success to family resources and social networks.

這些發(fā)現(xiàn)可能會讓兩種人吃驚，而這兩種人通常在政見上互相對立：一是那些相信某些“文化”能比其他文化取得更大成就的人，二是那些將成功歸因為家族資源和社會關(guān)系的人。

Culture is a nebulous category and it can’t explain the constant regression of family status — from the top and the bottom. High-status social groups in America are astonishingly diverse. There are representatives from nearly every major religious and ethnic group in the world — except for the group that led to the argument for culture as the foundation of social success: white European Protestants. Muslims are low-status in much of India and Europe, but Iranian Muslims are among the most elite of all groups in America.

文化這個范疇太過含糊不清，并不能解釋家族地位的均值回歸——不管是從高處回歸還是從低處回歸。美國上層社會群體是非常多元化的，這一點相當令人吃驚。在這些擁有較高社會地位的人中，你可以找到全世界幾乎所有主要宗教和種族的代表——但沒有來自歐洲的白人新教徒，這一群體往往被拿來佐證文化是取得社會成功的基礎(chǔ)。穆斯林在印度和歐洲的大部分地區(qū)都處在社會底層，但是伊朗穆斯林卻是美國最精英的群體之一。

Family resources and social networks are not irrelevant. Evidence has been found that programs from early childhood education to socioeconomic and racial classroom integration can yield lasting benefits for poor children. But the potential of such programs to alter the overall rate of social mobility in any major way is low. The societies that invest the most in helping disadvantaged children, like the Nordic countries, have produced absolute, commendable benefits for these children, but they have not changed their relative social position.

家族資源和人脈并不是無關(guān)的。有證據(jù)顯示，從早期的兒童教育到社會經(jīng)濟和種族的一體化教育，這樣的項目能夠為貧窮家庭的孩子帶來持續(xù)的好處。但是此類項目提高社會流動性的潛力都是很低的。那些煞費苦心幫助條件不利兒童的社會，比如北歐的國家，已經(jīng)取得了明顯的、可圈可點的益處，但都沒能改變這些兒童的相對社會地位。

The notion of genetic transmission of “social competence” — some mysterious mix of drive and ability — may unsettle us. But studies of adoption, in some ways the most dramatic of social interventions, support this view.

“社會競爭力”——某種神秘的內(nèi)驅(qū)力和能力的混合體——能夠通過基因遺傳，這一想法也許會讓我們感到不安。但是對領(lǐng)養(yǎng)（在某些方面這可謂是最激烈的社會干預(yù)行為了）的研究卻支持這一觀點。

A number of studies of adopted children in the United States and Nordic countries show convincingly that their life chances are more strongly predicted from their biological parents than their adoptive families. In America, for example, the I.Q. of adopted children correlates with their adoptive parents’ when they are young, but the correlation is close to zero by adulthood. There is a low correlation between the incomes and educational attainment of adopted children and those of their adoptive parents.

對美國和北歐被領(lǐng)養(yǎng)小孩的一些調(diào)查研究極有說服力地表明，從這些小孩的生物學(xué)父母——而非他們的養(yǎng)父母身上——的情況更能預(yù)測出他們的生活境遇。比如在美國，被領(lǐng)養(yǎng)小孩的智商在他們還小時同他們的養(yǎng)父母相關(guān)，但是當他們成年了，這種相關(guān)性就接近于0了。被領(lǐng)養(yǎng)孩子的收入和受教育程度同他們養(yǎng)父母的相關(guān)性不大。

These studies, along with studies of correlations across various types of siblings (identical twins, fraternal twins, half siblings) suggest that genetics is the main carrier of social status.

上述研究，加上對不同類型的兄弟姐妹（同卵雙胞胎、異卵雙胞胎、同母異父或同父異母）之間相關(guān)性的研究，都表明基因是決定社會地位的主要因素。

If we are right that nature predominates over nurture, and explains the low rate of social mobility, is that inherently a tragedy? It depends on your point of view.

如果真是大自然主導(dǎo)了出人頭地的機會，并且是低社會流動性的罪魁禍首，那豈不是說，從根本上而言，這就是一個悲劇？這要看你怎么想。

The idea that low-status ancestors might keep someone down many generations later runs against most people’s notions of fairness. But at the same time, the large investments made by the super-elite in their kids — like those of the Manhattan hedge-funders who spend a fortune on preschool — are of no avail in preventing long-run downward mobility.

來自社會底層的祖先會讓某人在時隔許多代以后仍然處在社會底層，這樣的觀點與大多數(shù)人對公平的理解相抵觸。但同時，上層精英對孩子們的大量投資——比如對學(xué)前教育一擲千金的曼哈頓對沖基金經(jīng)理們——并不能阻止子孫們在長久的時間跨度中社會地位的衰落。

Our findings do suggest that intermarriage among people of different strata will raise mobility over time. India, we found, has exceptionally low mobility in part because religion and caste have barred intermarriage. As long as mating is assortative — partners are of similar social status, regardless of ethnic, national or religious background — social mobility will remain low.

我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)確實表明不同社會地位的人通婚會在長期內(nèi)增加社會流動性。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)印度的社會流動性異常之低，部分原因便是宗教和種姓制度阻礙了這種通婚。只要婚姻奉行“非同類不婚”原則——擁有相似的社會地位，不管其種族、國籍或是宗教背景如何——社會流動性就會一直處在低水平。

As the political theorist John Rawls suggested in his landmark work “A Theory of Justice” (1971), innate differences in talent and drive mean that, to create a fair society, the disadvantages of low social status should be limited. We are not suggesting that the fact of slow mobility means that policies to lift up the lives of the disadvantaged are for naught — quite the opposite. Sweden is, for the less well off, a better place to live than the United States, and that is a good thing. And opportunities for people to flourish to the best of their abilities are essential.

政治理論家羅爾斯在他里程碑式著作《正義論》（1971年）中提出，才干和內(nèi)驅(qū)力的先天差異意味著，要創(chuàng)造一個公平的社會，卑微出身帶來的不利需要予以限制。我們不是暗示社會流動性低這一事實意味著那些幫助處于不利地位的人的政策就是徒勞的——恰恰相反。瑞典，對生活并不寬裕的人來說，是個比美國更好的選擇，而這是好事。讓人們有機會最大限度地發(fā)揮他們的能力是至關(guān)重要的。

Large-scale, rapid social mobility is impossible to legislate. What governments can do is ameliorate the effects of life’s inherent unfairness. Where we will fall within the social spectrum is largely fated at birth. Given that fact, we have to decide how much reward, or punishment, should be attached to what is ultimately fickle and arbitrary, the lottery of your lineage.

大范圍的、快速的社會流動是無法通過立法來實現(xiàn)的。政府能做的是削弱先天不公平所帶來的后果。我們會處在階層光譜的哪個位置，基本上在我們出生時就已經(jīng)決定了。基于這一事實，我們必須決定的是，由“族譜彩票”這一終歸是無情而武斷的因素所決定的賞罰額該有多大。

小師妹_c937B · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 08:10:59

買一堆金子放床底下，從此過上了睡在金子上的生活

楊善梅 · 發(fā)表于 2016-6-30 08:20:19

本帖最后由楊善梅于 2016-6-30 08:35 編輯

　　　有錢了，想吃好的，可是國內(nèi)的食品卻存在諸多不安全因素，不敢吃啊！；有錢了，帶著相機玩遍祖國大好河山，可是又怕路上遇到黑導(dǎo)游或黑飯店大把大把的坑騙；有錢了，家族中一些不勞而獲的窮光蛋便會在你的身上打主義，男人為此而打架斗毆，謀財害命，女人為此而相互勾心斗角，害人無形。現(xiàn)實交易里，我不要，白不要，我不拿，白不拿。拿到是我的本事，拿不到是我無能。這就是當今人與人之間關(guān)系的真實現(xiàn)狀，無利不起早，凡事皆為一個利，　　

　　想移民國外吧，可是咱們這一農(nóng)民工水太淺，對英克里西狗屁不通。即便狠命學(xué)習(xí)，僥幸通過了托福，想必那護照也是一個大問題。

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